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ABSTRACT 
 
Following an analysis of the forces behind the “global capital flows paradox” observed in 
the era of advancing financial globalization, this paper sets out to investigate the 
opportunity costs of self-insurance through precautionary reserve holdings. We reject the 
idea of reserves as low-cost protection against the vagaries of global finance. We also 
deny that arrangements giving rise to their rapid accumulation might be sustainable in the 
first place. Alternative policy options open to developing countries are explored, 
designed to limit both the risks of financial globalization and the costs of insurance-type 
responses. We propose comprehensive capital account management as an alternative to 
full capital account liberalization. The aims of a permanent regulatory regime of capital 
controls, with respect to both the aggregate size and the composition of capital flows, are 
twofold: first, to maintain sufficient macro policy space; second, to assure a good micro 
fit of external expertise incorporated in foreign direct investment as part of a country’s 
development strategy. 
 
Keywords: International Monetary Order; Financial Globalization; Capital Flows; 
Financial Crises; Capital Controls; Foreign Reserves 
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1. INTRODUCTION  
 
Capital account convertibility has been widely advertised as a market-oriented 
development strategy, with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) acting as a main 
protagonist in the ideological push for universal capital account convertibility. By 
permitting developing countries to draw on foreign saving (i.e., capital imports), the 
argument went, capital account convertibility would set free faster growth and catch-up. 
In actual fact, the era of advancing financial globalization has witnessed many 
developing countries running sizeable current account surpluses with massive official 
outflows into low-yielding U.S. dollar assets. From a mainstream theoretical viewpoint it 
is truly paradoxical that capital should flow from “South” to “North” rather than the 
opposite way—thereby even squeezing the developing world’s savings available for 
domestic investment and development, it would seem.  
  Following an analysis of the forces behind the so-called “global capital flows 
paradox” (Summers 2006), this paper sets out to investigate the opportunity costs of rapid 
reserve accumulation in developing countries and then explore potential alternatives. 
Apparently, developing countries accumulate reserves as protection against the 
insecurities inherent in today’s international monetary and financial order. While such a 
strategy of “self-insurance” was proposed by Martin Feldstein (1999) in the aftermath of 
the Asian crises, we agree with Rodrik (2006) that the insurance premium involved here 
may be higher than generally supposed. Related questions concern the effectiveness and 
sustainability of the supposed self-insurance scheme, as well as its overall economic 
wisdom compared to potential alternatives. It turns out that these questions pertain to 
another popular hypothesis put forward in this context, namely the “revived Bretton 
Woods regime” (BWII) hypothesis (Dooley, Folkerts-Landau, and Garber 2003). After 
highlighting some crucial shortcomings that question the supposed sustainability of 
BWII, we deny the ultimate wisdom of capital account convertibility in developing 
countries and propose an alternative strategy of comprehensive capital account 
management.  
  The paper begins with an analysis of the postwar international U.S. dollar 
standard together with a historical review of the evolution of the U.S. balance of   3
payments in view of the U.S.’s special status as the n
th country in the Bretton Woods 
regime. After offering some reservations concerning the supposed sustainability of the 
BWII regime in section 3, the analysis in section 4 turns toward assessing the true 
opportunity cost of self-insurance through U.S. dollar reserve holdings. This is followed 
in section 5 by a reconsidering of the overall wisdom of financial globalization as 
contributing toward development. We explore some alternative policy options of 
developing countries designed to contain the risks of financial globalization and avoid the 
costs of insurance-type responses. Section 6 concludes.   
 
2. BRETTON WOODS, THE U.S. DOLLAR, AND THE N
TH COUNTRY ROLE 
 
In any pegged exchange-rate regime of n currencies, there are only n-1 exchange rates to 
peg, leaving one degree of freedom concerning the regime’s overall monetary stance. 
Typically, it may fall on one county, the n
th country, to act both as currency anchor, as 
well as engine (or last resort) of economic expansion. For, to the extent that the n-1 
members’ demand for international liquidity is not provided for through some common 
institution or mechanism that either pools and clears member currencies and/or creates 
liquidity on its own (a role assigned to the International Monetary Fund in the Bretton 
Woods regime of 1944), their demand can ultimately only be met by the n
th country itself 
through running a balance of payments deficit. The key currency issuer’s flexible policy 
reaction is thus vital to the global economy. In particular, any aggregate increase in the 
propensity to hoard the reserve currency (or, rise in international liquidity preference) 
will otherwise put upward pressure on its exchange rate and create deflationary pressures 
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Source:  Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the U.S. 
Department of the Treasury 
 
  Throughout the postwar period, contradicting fears of a built-in contractionary 
bias widely held at the time of the Bretton Woods negotiations in 1944, the United States 
has proven itself sufficiently flexibly and creative in making U.S. dollar reserves 
available to the rest of the world. Figure 1 shows the evolution of the U.S. current 
account balance, (net) foreign direct investment (FDI) and (net) portfolio equity flows, 
U.S. private capital outflows (other than FDI and portfolio equity), and official inflows 
since 1960 (or later depending on data availability; all expressed as percent of U.S. 
GDP). Ignoring U.S. official reserve outflows, balance of payments accounting implies 
that deficits on current account and private capital outflows require corresponding foreign 
(private and/or official) flows into U.S. assets.  
  It is noteworthy that the United States had a current account surplus position until 
1970. In the early postwar years, generous official aid (the “Marshall Plan,” in particular) 
provided foreign countries with the needed U.S. dollars. Then, during the 1950s and 60s,   5
U.S. foreign direct investment provided the key source of U.S. dollar reserves. Rapid 
catching-up growth in Western Europe and Japan was made possible in a low inflation, 
low interest rate environment, with the United States providing restraint. This global 
constellation came under rising stress over the course of the 1960s for two reasons. First, 
progressive easing of capital controls and the emergence and growth of Eurocurrency 
markets in London allowed a rising role for private short-term funds attracted by interest 
rate differentials (which were adverse to the United States). Second, the Vietnam War 
pushed the U.S.’s resource needs beyond the country’s own means so that the current 
account deteriorated and turned into deficit in 1971.  
  In the end, the Bretton Woods regime of pegged exchange rates failed for reasons 
of dollar abundance rather than scarcity as Europe’s refusal to either accept currency 
revaluation or accumulate more dollars put mounting pressure on the dollar’s supposed 
gold backing. U.S. President Nixon responded on August 15, 1971 by officially cutting 
the U.S. dollar free from gold. The era of floating dollar exchange rates vis-à-vis the 
currencies of industrialized trading partners started, giving way to the economic and 
financial instabilities of the 1970s.  
  In fact, during the 1970s economic and political vulnerability seemed to 
undermine U.S. leadership and dollar hegemony. The deutschmark and the yen emerged 
as competing reserve currencies. There were even initiatives for international policy 
coordination featuring Europe as a new global “locomotive” for recovery from the oil-
price shock. Arguably, the perceived failure of the agreed macro stimulus program of the 
late 1970s not only inspired a lasting paradigm shift in German economic policymaking 
in 1982 (forcing the French “franc fort” policy shortly later), but thereby also bequeathed 
a peculiar “supply-side-only” policy wisdom to the Maastricht regime of Europe’s 
monetary union (EMU), (mis-)guiding Euroland’s policymakers until today. The impact 
on the developing world was profound, too. Essentially, the first wave of financial 
globalization featuring increased bank lending (“petrodollar recycling”) to Latin 
American and other developing countries, although welcomed at the time to support 
global growth, set the stage for the developing-country debt crises of the 1980s.  
  The developing-country debt crises were triggered by short-term U.S. interest 
rates reaching exorbitant levels in the early 1980s. The “Volcker shock” also gave rise to   6
a global recession from which the U.S. miraculously emerged with its global leadership 
role reestablished and its currency surging on the exchanges despite the U.S.’s “twin 
deficits” (on both its current account and government budget). As private (non-FDI, 
nonequity) capital outflows from the United States slowed sharply in 1982 and the United 
States started to attract net FDI inflows throughout the 1980s, a surging U.S. current 
account deficit became the key source of foreign acquisitions of U.S. assets.  
  In fact, since the early 1980s, U.S. global leadership included acting as the lead 
driver of global demand growth most of the time, resulting in (almost) continuous current 
account deficits ever since. While the United States attracted large private capital inflows 
in the late 1990s (including net FDI and net equity inflows), since 2002 foreign official 
inflows have come to play a rather prominent role, exceeding previous episodes of dollar 
weakness in the late 1980s and mid 1990s, a feature that has inspired BWII and also 
relates to the “global capital flows paradox” to be discussed below in sections 3 and 4, 
respectively.  
  Decomposing the U.S. current account deficit into its key sources or counterparts, 
figure 2 reveals that the U.S. current account deficit of the first half of the 1980s mainly 
mirrored the lagging of Japan and Europe behind the U.S. locomotive (propelled by the 
Reagan fiscal expansion). The situation changed in the second half of the 1980s, as the 
U.S. dollar depreciated (following the Plaza Accord), oil prices slumped, and both Japan 
and Europe experienced a belated economic boom (lasting until 1990 in Japan’s case and 
1991 in Germany’s), whereas the United States experienced a mild recession in 1991. 
Accordingly, the U.S. current account deficit shrunk after 1986 and even briefly 
disappeared by 1991 (also reflecting foreign transfer payments in recognition of U.S. 
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Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) 
 
  This was a brief reversal of roles though. Since 1992 the bilateral positions with 
Japan and Europe have steadily deteriorated once again as both Japan and Germany got 
stuck in protracted domestic demand stagnation and German (“supply-side-only”) policy 
“wisdom” was exported to Europe via the Maastricht Treaty of 1991. Apart from 
representing a recurrent element in the U.S. current account imbalance, stagnation in 
Europe and Japan may actually be singled out as the dominant factor for the 1990s.
1 In 
recent years, at least the imbalance with Europe has declined markedly from its peak in 
2005, owing to both a belated pickup in European growth in 2006, as well as exchange-
rate developments since 2002. By contrast, the bilateral imbalance with China, which has 
been the primary focus of debate in the United States in recent years, has grown 
significantly since 2002 (although to some extent replacing deficits with other East Asian 
                                                 
1 In its World Economic Outlook of September 2002, the International Monetary Fund still observed that 
“external imbalances across the main industrial country regions widened steadily during the 1990s [with 
these imbalances being] dominated by the euro area and Japan, respectively” (IMF 2002: 65–7). 
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countries). And as fast industrialization and catch-up in China is widely held to be a key 
driving force behind the oil price (and the more general commodity price) boom of recent 
years, the “China factor” may also be related to the rise in the U.S.’s petroleum trade 
deficit, reaching some $300 billion in 2007. A look at the composition of the U.S. current 
account imbalance thus reveals that the build-up of the U.S.’s external deficit since 1991 
is owed to a whole variety of factors, including: protracted domestic demand stagnation 
in some key industrialized countries, the emergence of China on the global scene, and the 
oil price.  
While the U.S. current account deficit has been at the center of concern about 
“global imbalances,” figure 3 focuses on the other side of the imbalance, namely, today’s 
largest current account surplus countries (or groups of countries). The list includes 
Germany and Japan, with current account improvements of around $285 billion and $90 
billion since 2000, respectively, and China with a current account improvement of some 
$350 billion since 2003. Note that China only emerged as a globally significant factor at 
that time. Saudi Arabia’s sharply improved current account position (by some $80 billion 
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Source: IMF 
Note: IMF classification of emerging and developing countries, plus NICs, but excluding China and Saudi  
Arabia. 
 
In addition, figure 3 also reveals another conspicuous fact and contributing factor 
to the build-up of global imbalances. In the late 1990s, the aggregate current account 
position of “emerging and developing countries” as a whole (including the “newly 
industrialized countries,” but excluding China and Saudi Arabia, which are shown 
separately) turned from deficit into surplus.
2 In other words, in the aftermath of the Asian 
crises, capital flows changed direction, and, ever since, they have been flowing from poor 
to rich countries, primarily the United States. Apparently triggered by the Asian crises, a 
conspicuous course change in behavior has turned the developing world as a whole into a 
net capital exporter and hoarder of surging reserve holdings in the form of U.S. Treasury 
                                                 
2 While not shown separately in figure 2, Henning (2000) estimates that almost $100 billion of the rise in 
the U.S. deficit at that time was a consequence of allowing Asian and other crises economies to see their 
current account positions turn into surplus in the aftermath of the crises.  
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securities—a phenomenon that was dubbed the “global capital flows paradox” by former 
U.S. Treasury Secretary Larry Summers (2006).  
In summary, in view of the U.S.’s n
th country status, the U.S. current account 
deficit has largely been a reflection and by-product of the U.S.’s flexible response to 
deficient demand elsewhere in the world economy. Essentially, in freely playing its n
th 
country role, the issuer of the world’s key reserve currency stimulated domestic demand 
growth whenever deflationary pressures arrived at its shores. Owing to the fact that this 
global arrangement worked rather well, at least until recently, an oil price boom has 
further magnified the U.S. current account deficit. The next section will scrutinize the 
supposed sustainability of the U.S.’s external deficit, as suggested by Dooley, Folkerts-
Landau, and Garber 2003 in the “revived Bretton Woods system” hypothesis (or BWII). 
 
3. BWII RECONSIDERED  
 
According to the BWII, the “imbalances” in global current account positions that have 
featured prominently as crucial risks to global stability in policy debates in recent years 
were actually an indication of a sustainable symbiosis of interests among deficit (U.S.) 
and surplus (developing world) countries. In this view, the developing world’s interest is 
to sell its products into the large U.S. market as a way of stimulating employment growth 
and development. The U.S. economy, on the other hand, is flexible enough to tolerate the 
resulting quasipermanent drag on U.S. income growth given its comparative advantage in 
creating safe financial assets, which provide the collateral for the FDI stock needed in the 
developing world to complement its vast cheap labor resources in export production.  
  Important elements of agreement between BWII and the analysis of the U.S.’s n
th 
country status presented in the previous section cannot be denied. In fact, we argue that 
the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system of pegged-but-adjustable exchange rates in 
the early 1970s did not fundamentally change the hegemonic position of the U.S. dollar at 
all. If anything, floating exchange rates, together with financial globalization, have 
further magnified the influence of, and benefits thereby bestowed upon, the system’s lead 
country in playing its n
th country role. This section highlights certain disagreements with   11
BWII that also raise doubts about the regime’s supposed sustainability despite the 
subprime crisis, as recently reconfirmed by Dooley, Folkerts-Landau, and Garber (2008).  
  To begin with, it is curious that BWII completely neglects factors other than the 
supposed neomercantilist development strategy of prominent emerging-market 
economies, with China in particular, thereby assigned center stage in the BWII 
interpretation of the build-up of global imbalances (Bibow 2007). This conflicts with the 
fact that China has only become a globally significant factor in recent years. Instead, it 
was the sum of factors discussed in the previous section that has led the United States 
onto the increasingly unbalanced path that culminated in the subprime crisis. And, next, it 
seems unlikely to us that the United States will get back on its feet any time soon and 
continue playing the role reserved for it in BWII as if nothing has ever happened. By 
implication, with the United States as caboose rather than engine of the global economy, 
continued global growth will require a change in behavior on the part of a number of 
players, including the stagnant industrialized countries and commodity-rich countries. 
Figure 4 highlights the reversal in the contributions of net exports to U.S. GDP growth 
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U.S. net exports (rhs) U.S. domestic demand U.S. GDP growth
Source: OECD Economic Outlook, No. 83 (June 2008) 
 
  While the first two criticisms are empirical, the next concerns theory, namely the 
supposed ways in which the “massive excess supply of labor in Asia” (Dooley, Folkerts-
Landau, and Garber 2008) could produce the excess domestic demand growth in the 
United States that was required to keep the global economic cylinders humming. Starting 
from a theoretical position that appears to be similar to what also inspired Bernanke’s 
(2005, 2007) “saving glut hypothesis,” Dooley, Folkerts-Landau, and Garber (2008: fn 3) 
assert that “the advent of the [BWII] system persistently lowered the long term rate of 
interest at every stage of the business cycle because of the large scale supply of net 
savings that emerging market countries were pushing into the industrial countries,” 
developments which they attribute to the “historically unusual decision of many EM 
governments to place a substantial share of national savings in international financial 
assets.”  
  In their view, domestic institutional deficiencies in developing countries 
rationalize the observed two-way capital flows with net flows from poor to rich. Official   13
outflows into reserves “collateralize” private inflows (i.e., assure foreign investors of a 
safe exit option), while net capital outflows from poor countries represent no real loss of 
domestic savings, as these would be wasted anyway. They would be wasted because 
deficiencies in domestic financial institutions prevent domestic savings from being 
intermediated efficiently into capital formation. In this view, capital controls on outflows 
would appear to be positively harmful as “capital flight from distorted emerging market 
financial markets can promote growth if that capital is returned by investors attracted by 
high return projects” (Dooley, Folkerts-Landau, and Garber 2008).  
  I have argued elsewhere that this explanation for Greenspan’s famous “bond 
market conundrum” is based on flawed loanable funds theory [see Bibow (2001, 2008, 
and 2009)].
3 An alternative liquidity preference theoretical explanation starts from the 
observation that the expansion in the United States was made possible in the first place 
not by “excess saving” on the part of anyone, but by nothing else but dollar liquidity. 
Dollar liquidity—based on U.S. credit creation!—spilled over to much of the rest of the 
world through U.S. spending growth in excess of U.S. income growth and soaring global 
imbalances. The alternative liquidity preference theoretical explanation attributes the 
phenomenon to a global dollar glut arising in an environment of deficient demand in 
product markets with the United States playing its n
th country role. Importantly, in this 
view, developments in product and labor markets triggered the policy and market 
responses that delivered low interest rates ruling in financial markets. Imagined “excess 
saving” in Asia did neither directly lower U.S. interest rates nor provide “finance” for the 
U.S. boom in domestic demand (other than in ex post balance of payments accounting).  
The global dollar glut occured at low interest rates since both key ingredients 
were in place; first, low U.S. policy rates and, second, benign interest rate expectations 
                                                 
3 Loanable funds theory continues to enjoy immense popularity today, and not only among mainstream 
economists. Calling upon Greenspan as support for her interpretation of international capital flows in and 
out of the U.S., D’Arista (2007–2008: 14) asserts that in both 2004 and 2005 “the excessive inflow of 
foreign savings returned into the global economy as U.S. residents recycled the surplus capital they could 
not use profitably at home.” The point is that those foreign savers, who only have any saving to allocate if 
they happen to earn the income out of which to save in the first place, simply cannot create U.S. dollars, but 
only use dollars either acquired through net exports (i.e., the source of the income creation) or capital 
inflows. Any increased aggregate desire on the part of foreign residents to hold U.S. dollars will tend to put 
upward pressure on the dollar’s exchange rate, as was the case from 1995 to early 2002 (the period to 
which Greenspan’s observations actually referred). Developments since then were rather different though.   
   14
held by financial market players. Both policy rates and interest rate expectations 
remained low despite rapid demand growth because of vast new global supply-side 
opportunities and generally weak pressures in labor markets. Even as inflationary 
pressures finally emerged in 2007 (reflecting global commodity resource constraints), 
bond yield stayed low as markets apparently judged that the global boom and the 
monetary tightening cycle were already at or past their peak, so that inflationary pressures 
would soon abate again.
4  
  Note that the link is running from global demand conditions in product (and 
labor) markets—rather than any imaginary “saving glut” in capital markets—to U.S. 
interest rates featuring the U.S.’s n
th country role and the Fed’s mandate to maintain high 
employment and price stability in the U.S. The link was most clearly visible in the 
context of the “2001 global slowdown,” with rising unemployment and deflation threats 
in the United States. There can be little doubt that the global boom was sponsored by 
highly expansionary U.S. fiscal and monetary policies (see Godley et al. 2007). The U.S. 
fiscal stance was eased by an unprecedented six percent of GDP between 2000 and 2003, 
while the U.S. Federal Reserve cut 550 basis points off its Fed Funds target between 
January 2001 and the end of 2002. The U.S. expansion was transmitted throughout the 
“dollar zone” through the developing world’s policy of maintaining a competitive 
exchange rate vis-à-vis the U.S. dollar. 
  And yet, while expansionary fiscal policy played an important role in the U.S. 
recovery since 2001 (as had been previously the case in the early 1980s and early 1990s, 
too), public debt as a percent of GDP has been rather trendless over the period as a 
whole. In other words, while fiscal policy was successfully used in an anticyclical fashion 
to stabilize the U.S. economy, the excess of U.S. domestic demand growth over GDP 
growth and rising U.S. external deficit was not driven by public, but private, spending. 
The U.S. expansion was essentially a consumer boom—based on rising consumer debt 
                                                 
4 This market consensus got challenged in the spring of 2008 under the leadership of the European Central 
Bank (ECB), raising the specter of “preemptive” interest hikes at envisioned threats of second-round effects 
(in the context of a weakening growth momentum underway in Euroland and the world economy) and 
causing manifold irritations in financial markets. The ECB followed through with hiking interest rates in 
July, only to make a fool of itself as Euroland’s predictable inability to “decouple” became all too apparent 
at just that time.  
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(mortgage debt in particular). BWII totally misses this point and its relevance concerning 
the supposed sustainability of the regime.   
  Behind the macro policy mix that produced this outcome is an ideology that 
generally abhors public spending, budget deficits, and public debt. Therefore, if the 
United States is to play its n
th country role, it is left to the Federal Reserve and monetary 
policy to make this possible. In general, this requires interest rates that are low enough, 
and asset prices that are high enough, to bring forth the private spending sufficient to 
maintain high employment and price stability in the U.S. Over time, as the rest of the 
world became overly reliant on the U.S. growth engine (see section 2), the Federal 
Reserve had to kick the accelerator especially hard in the aftermath of the dot.com bubble 
burst. Essentially, with the corporate sector in balance-sheet-repair mode, U.S. consumers 
alone had to be sufficiently enticed to do the excess spending required to get the global 
economy back on track—as they duly did.  
  Rather unsurprisingly, the largest impact on the U.S. economy itself came through 
the housing sector, the one large domestic sector in which offshoring is not an issue 
(while immigrant labor surely is). As to industry, automobile demand, based on either 
auto loans or home equity loans, was the key driver. As to services, Wall Street truly 
thrived on the surge in U.S. spending, both in product markets as well as asset markets, 
including international capital flows. Today, following years of exuberance, overhang 
characterizes construction and auto industries, property markets and Wall Street alike. 
The subprime crisis is really only the tip of the iceberg in all this.  
  While it is certainly appropriate today to investigate the fraud elements involved 
in the property and credit booms, to think more carefully about properly designing 
anticyclical financial regulations and to review blindly adored financial innovations in a 
more sober light, it seems somewhat misplaced to put all the blame at the Federal 
Reserve’s doorstep regarding its “easy money” monetary policies.
5 For the Federal 
                                                 
5 A debate has been rekindled on the role of asset prices in monetary policy. German/European central 
bankers seem to feel vindicated in their view that it is not good enough to wait until it is time to mop up the 
mess after the bubble burst (the Greenspan doctrine). Not only does any Schadenfreude seem hypocritical 
given that, despite its “stability-oriented” central bankers, Europe has seen its own fair share of bubbles. 
The point is that if the Federal Reserve had ever followed Bundesbank wisdom, the global economy would 
have remained stuck in permanent stagnation ever since the early 1980s (as Germany did except for brief 
interruptions sponsored by export booms and the accidental unification boom).  
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Reserve was following its U.S. mandate as—globally—the United States played its n
th 
country role. While internally the United States went through a “Minskian boom-bust 
cycle,” ironically, externally the United States became portrayed as the villain behind 
soaring global imbalances. Yet, a world economy less reliant on U.S. domestic demand 
growth would have seen very different monetary policies from the Federal Reserve, too. 
In a financially globalized world scrambling for safety in exporting and running up U.S. 
dollar holdings, while hamstrung by an ideology that frowns upon fiscal policy and 
public debt, the U.S. consumer—enabled by private debts!—became the world’s 
spending power of last resort.    
  There are a number of important upshots concerning the global economic 
situation today and the next five years. First, the focus on China’s (and other developing 
countries’) accumulation of a rising share of the outstanding stock of U.S. public debt 
(i.e., those safe assets the U.S. has a comparative advantage in providing according to 
BWII) overlooks the fact that the consumer boom was actually built upon the liberal 
creation of huge amounts of rather unsafe assets, as the ongoing subprime crisis has 
brought to light. After many years of earning handsome margins and fees on its credit 
creation and intermediation services, Wall Street is now caught up with its debtors’ fate 
as the exuberant leveraging drive of yesterday has turned into deleveraging—the full 
economic repercussions of which have yet to work their way through the system.  
  Second, as the U.S. consumer has got overburdened in shouldering the U.S.’s n
th 
country role (over the past five years in particular), the old (BWII) regime seems unlikely 
to get back on track any time soon—contradicting the forecast made by Dooley, Folkerts-
Landau, and Garber (2008) that the future will be more of the same in following the 
system’s dynamics to its terminus. Instead, the possibility of a U.S. consumer 
retrenchment poses a serious threat to global stability. In addition to the sharp rise in 
mortgage indebtedness, figure 5 shows that since the final quarter of 2007 U.S. 
households’ net worth is declining, reflecting the impact of falling property and equity 
prices on leveraged household balance sheets, with household leverage (not shown) itself 
at a record high.
6 
                                                 
6 The background and inspiration to my analysis is Wynne Godley’s work on the unsustainability of 
internal processes in the U.S. economy in the 1990s [cf. Godley (1999), for instance], regular updates of   17





















































public debt (%GDP) - lhs household mortgage liability (%DPI) - lhs
household net worth (%DPI) - rhs Personal saving (%DPI; NIPA) - rhs
Source: BEA, Federal Reserve, and IMF 
 
  No doubt the Federal Reserve’s actions to provide emergency liquidity have gone 
a long way in preventing the unfolding credit crunch from slipping into a full financial 
meltdown. But the underlying solvency issue requires bold fiscal actions, too. In addition 
to essentially transforming old (underwater) private debts into public debts (i.e., large-
scale bailouts of consumers and/or their creditors), the only effective strategy that could 
get the U.S. economy and the BWII regime back on track is a large and sustained fiscal 
expansion (probably with a medium-run budget deficit of some 5 percent of GDP and 
                                                                                                                                                 
which appear as the Levy Economics Institute’s “Strategic Analysis.” I first presented my analysis of 
global imbalances as the external counterpart to unsustainable U.S. internal trends in early 2006 [later 
published as Bibow (2007); see also chapter 1 of UNCTAD (2006), which I coauthored]. Roubini and 
Setser (2005) denied the sustainability of BWII, though largely for risks related to the U.S.’s external 
indebtedness. Roubini is widely credited today for predicting the meltdown in 2006 (see The New York 
Times of August 17, 2008). Palley (2007–2008), too, denied the supposed sustainability of BWII, 
emphasizing the role of the U.S. housing price bubble. His figure 1 (Palley 2007–2008: 44) showing East 
Asian economies financing U.S. banks that in turn lend to U.S. consumers smacks of loanable funds theory 
though, which runs totally counter to the analysis proposed here.   
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even larger than that in the short run). Interestingly, while the external financing costs for 
U.S. external debts would be as before, at least for as long as foreigners continue to buy 
and hold safe U.S. public debt, the U.S. internal distributional consequences of a “revived 
Bretton Woods system” actually based on the public debt which then ends up in the 
official portfolios of the developing world—call it “BWIII”—would be rather different 
compared to the derailed (pre-subprime) BWII [see Bibow (2009)]. The fact that Wall 
Street profited so handsomely from the U.S. consumer boom and the process of U.S. 
dollar-based financial globalization providing its global outlet directs our attention to the 
other side of the coin: the developing world’s true opportunity cost of self-insurance in a 
financially globalized world centered around the U.S. dollar.  
 
4. TRUE OPPORTUNITY COST OF SELF- INSURANCE  
 
The phenomenon of the developing world at large turning into a net capital exporter, with 
surging reserve holdings in the form of U.S. Treasury securities, was dubbed the “global 
capital flows paradox” (Summers 2006). Apart from again highlighting the conspicuous 
turning point in the aggregate current account balance of the developing world in 1998–9, 
figure 6 also shows that surging reserve accumulations have been sourced from both 
current account surpluses, as well as net private capital inflows. Does the developing 
world really have much of an interest in a quasipermanent arrangement along BWII (or, 
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  Recall that according to Dooley, Folkerts-Landau, and Garber (2008) the 
observed net capital outflows from the developing world represent no real loss to them 
since those savings would go to waste if they stayed at home anyway. As to the holding 
of foreign exchange reserves as self-insurance, the view seems to prevail that the costs 
involved are rather low or that self-insurance may even represent a free lunch (Ginsberg 
et al. 2005). Furthermore, some observers emphasize that the benefits of current 
arrangements clearly outweigh any costs, with Kregel (2008) also suggesting an 
interesting parallel between the BWII regime and Keynes’s clearing union plan for 
Bretton Woods. Kregel highlights the quasiautomatic credit mechanism involved in 
extending finance to the deficit country, thereby preventing any deflationary response 
while, at the same time, meeting any increased demand for international liquidity, too 
(serving self-insurance purposes). [Compared to BWI], Kregel argues, the “current 
international system, driven by private international capital flows, seems closer to that 
proposed in Keynes’s clearing union with these developing surplus countries   20
automatically providing financing required by deficit countries to sustain growth and 
employment” (Kregel 2008: 8).  
  To begin with, I agree that BWII may provide a safer and more effective 
development strategy than the alternative of reliance on capital imports (as a supposed 
supplement of domestic saving). Experience has shown that tolerating exchange rate 
appreciation and current account deficits may do little to lastingly boost capital 
accumulation and development, but foster asset price bubbles and consumption booms 
instead, followed by financial crisis and severe economic dislocations. After all, recurrent 
financial and economic crises in the developing world in the age of financial 
globalization, together with the proven insufficiency of multilateral insurance through 
official international liquidity provision by the IMF in the context of the Asian crises, 
appear to have motivated the conspicuous course change on the part of the developing 
world at issue here. Furthermore, in view of the investment and growth performance seen 
in the developing world since 2002, it is not obvious that any growth opportunities might 
have been foregone by not relying on (net) capital imports, but even exporting capital 
instead (UNCTAD 2008). Granted all that, the issue remains whether the developing 
world’s revealed preference for taking out self-insurance really comes at a low costs or 
represents a (near) free lunch?  
Unfortunately, assessing the costs of self-insurance is not a straightforward 
matter. Probably the most commonly used approach is simply to quantify any monetary 
loss arising from the yield spread between U.S. Treasuries and the respective domestic 
financial instruments, either assets sold or liabilities issued by the monetary authorities in 
sterilizing the reserve accumulation. In general, measured in this way, the cost of reserve 
holdings appears to be fairly low; in cases of developing countries with low domestic 
interest rates (implying a positive carry), reserve accumulation may even seem profitable 
(Ginsberg et al. 2005). The point is that this approach only narrowly measures the “fiscal 
cost” of sterilized interventions, but does not provide a measure of the “(self-) insurance 
premium” at issue here from a national viewpoint.  
Rodrik (2006: 7) proposed an alternative measure as “the appropriate way of 
thinking about the social costs of reserves” that focuses on the “spread between the 
private sector’s cost of short-term borrowing abroad and the yield that the central bank   21
earns on its liquid foreign assets.” Based on an assumed 500-basis-points spread, his 
estimates show social costs of reserve holdings in the order of 1 percent of developing 
countries GDP. The insurance costs on “excess” reserves (i.e., reserves in excess of the 3-
months-imports rule considered safe for current account transactions prior to financial 
globalization
7) thus measured offer “a more realistic estimate of the costs imposed by 
financial globalization per se,” in Rodrik’s view (2006: 8)  
Rodrik’s measure shows that what is involved here is really a kind of 
“intermediation loss” (more precisely, a loss from the perspective of the developing 
country, but a profit from the perspective of the provider of international liquidity 
services). Ironically, while the foreign borrowing (of reserves, in effect) does not provide 
any real resource transfer to poor countries, this intermediation loss incurred thereby 
surely does (albeit from poor to rich).
8 Rodrik’s exclusive focus on short-term debt is 
inspired by the idea that increasing reserves or reducing short-term foreign debts are 
alternative ways to increase liquidity and that, in practice, short-term debt seems to 
represent the most relevant opportunity cost. It appears to me though that any short-term 
foreign borrowing undertaken to acquire reserves altogether fails to increase net liquidity 
(and protection) anyway, while involving an intermediation loss that is hard to rationalize 
in the first place. It may of course be that the foreign borrowing is undertaken by private 
domestic entities for motives independent of the resulting official sector’s accumulation 
of liquid foreign assets.  
Perhaps it may be better then to broaden the perspective and instead start from the 
returns in general that foreign investors can earn on investments in a developing country. 
The key question then is what benefits arise for the developing host country in allowing 
foreign investors to earn these apparently attractive returns. Any benefits arising in this 
way will likely depend on the type of investment and the financing involved. Based on a 
cost-benefit analysis, policy should be geared towards national development goals. 
Capital inflows may seem rational from a private microeconomic perspective, but be 
costly from a national one. For instance, it may not be in a country’s best interest to 
                                                 
7 Other common measures feature the ratio of M2 over reserves and the ratio of short-term external debt 
over reserves, also known as the “Guidotti rule.”  
8 See Kregel (2004) and Ocampo (2007–2008) on “reverse aid.” 
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tolerate that private domestic entities find it beneficial to incur short-term foreign debts 
for which the public sector, in effect, pays an insurance premium to foreign investors—
involving an element of domestic subsidy apart from rewarding foreigners for no good 
reason. The point is that it may be possible to achieve the same domestic outcome in 
alternative ways, but without wasteful self-insurance (through borrowed reserves that 
incur an intermediation loss).  
Another approach to assessing the costs of reserve holdings is provided by Hauner 
(2005), who proposed a more comprehensive analysis of the fiscal opportunity costs, that 
also considers the social return on public investment as a relevant alternative. Notice, 
however, that if rising foreign reserves provided the rationale to increase public 
investment there would be a direct impact on the income generation process. Actually 
succeeding in reducing reserves, or decelerating their accumulation, then depends on how 
much of the income generation takes place outside the country at hand (through increased 
imports). But instead of just considering any public investment foregone by holding 
reserves, one may again broaden the perspective and include other alternatives. Surely tax 
cuts provide another option if the plan were to relax the fiscal stance in view of rising 
reserves, with additional private investment or consumption as the relevant opportunity 
cost to account for in this case. Again, a direct impact on the income generation process 
is involved. When deciding on the best option available in any particular situation, the 
key issue is what is in best accordance with a country’s development strategy and current 
macroeconomic policy stance.  
  In attempting to further disentangle the matter, recall here that the developing 
world’s soaring low-yielding foreign reserves are being sourced from both current 
account surpluses, as well as private capital inflows. Arguably, while the latter is perhaps 
more directly related to the self-insurance motive, the former source may also be more 
closely motivated by mercantilistic motives. Moreover, while the latter source is in the 
first instance in the nature of international financial intermediation (though generating an 
income flow from poor to rich, as argued above), the former is by itself in the nature of an 
intertemporal transfer of resources, though strangely, it seems, also from poor to rich. 
Essentially, with the developing world running current account surpluses and exporting   23
capital, consumption and/or domestic investment opportunities are foregone in the 
present, presumably in exchange for an enlarged potential for future consumption.  
The trouble is to see how the enlarged future consumption is supposed to be made 
possible from investing in low-yielding foreign assets denominated in a depreciating 
foreign currency. Also, it is not clear why a poor country should forego present 
consumption in the first place when, supposedly, the social rate of time preference is 
fairly high, especially under conditions of widespread poverty, but certainly higher than 
in the rich, developed destination countries of capital flows. In other words, even if 
investment and growth performance has been benign despite being based on domestic 
saving only, there is no denying that the current account surpluses of the developing 
world involve a tradeoff between present and future consumption.  
Note here that my focus is on too low present consumption, unrewarded by 
enlarged future consumption, which contrasts with the orthodox focus on investment, 
depicting capital imports as supplementing domestic saving as a source of capital 
accumulation. In the orthodox view there is no way around concluding that the 
international capital flows paradox poses an additional constraint on capital accumulation 
in poor countries. The point is that evidence of strong investment and growth in recent 
years poses quite a challenge to orthodoxy. Perhaps, then, one has to conclude that it is 
simply wrong to presume a “chronic ‘savings gap’” (UNCTAD 2008) as posing an 
effective constraint on capital accumulation and development.
9  
Be that as it may, it appears to me that in certain countries there may, if anything, 
even be at risk of over-investment (complementing the hypothesized underconsumption) 
driven by exports in an undervaluation context. The risk is that over time economic 
structures may get distorted, ending in crisis once the unsustainable cumulative processes 
stemming from these distortions unravel.  
Either explicitly or implicitly, proponents of BWII seem to presume the following 
conditions. First, international arrangements and economic structures are sustainable so 
that the development process will not get derailed in a crisis before any enlarged future 
consumption potential can be reaped, leaving part of the accumulated capital stock 
                                                 
9 This denial of a key orthodox presumption is, however, not the same as confirming the Dooley, Folkerts-
Landau, and Garber (2008) position, which I argued above is itself based on flawed theory.   24
obsolete, too. Second, capital accumulation and productivity increases boost future 
consumption potential sufficiently to overall justify foregone present consumption and 
self-insurance costs incurred. Third, capital accumulation and productivity increases 
achieved in this way are not otherwise obtainable. The jury is still out on whether the 
post-Asian crises development strategy of persistent current account surpluses is anymore 
sustainable than the prior strategy of tolerating current account deficits. 
Differentiating the two sources of foreign reserve holdings served analytical 
purposes and shed some interesting light on the matter. Arguably, however, both sources 
are ultimately driven by the same underlying safety concerns—the risks of financial and 
economic instability that financial globalization has exposed the developing world to. I 
am therefore doubtful whether quantitative analyses along the lines of Aizenman and Lee 
(2007) are really meaningful. The real question is whether coping with heightened risk 
exposures owing to financial globalization along the lines of BWII ultimately justifies the 
costs of self-insurance borne by the developing world. While it may be impossible to 
precisely quantify the costs of self-insurance,
10 seen by daylight, capital account 
convertibility appears to be a nifty mechanism for rent extraction working through the 
defensive behavior of developing countries under the existing international monetary 
nonorder. Is capital account convertibility really a necessary condition for reaping any 
potential benefits of globalization? It is time to consider alternatives.  
 
5. IS IT WORTH THE PREMIUM? WHAT ARE THE ALTERNATIVES TO 
UNLEASHED FINANCIAL GLOBALIZATION? 
 
The above analysis has left us with some serious doubts about the supposed wisdom of 
full capital account convertibility in developing countries. Contrary to orthodox 
                                                 
10 If anything, Rodrik’s (2006) estimate of 1 percent of the developing world’s GDP would seem to be on 
the low side, especially considering the foregone present consumption in poor countries. Will the present 
current-account-surplus-running periphery, once matured, be able to pass on their (excess?) international 
reserves to a new periphery? The role of today’s international monetary (non-)order may also be seen by 
considering that proper “retirement/repayment” of reserve assets (i.e., debts) would require current account 
surpluses by today’s reserve currency issuers at some point in the future. The U.S.’s positive investment 
income balance and stable net international investment position as a percent of GDP, despite huge current 
account deficits, are relevant facts about the other side of the coin used as international currency. 
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expectations, capital accumulation in the developing world at large has not been 
augmented by foreign saving since the Asian crises; apparently capital imports are too 
unsafe to rely upon. Apparently many developing countries have come to consider a 
competitive exchange rate as key to sustained growth. The sizeable (self-)insurance 
premium incurred through bloated foreign reserve holdings, sourced from both current 
account surpluses and private capital inflows, reveals financial globalization as a nifty 
device for rent extraction.   
  Ultimately, the problem with full capital account convertibility is that it restricts 
developing countries’ policy space to such a degree that it appears prudent to them to pay 
an onerous insurance premium to recapture at least some of the lost ground. Referring to 
the gold-standard era with free capital mobility, Keynes identified the macroeconomic 
wisdom of a mercantilistic development strategy under such conditions. In chapter 23 of 
The General Theory (titled “Notes on Mercantilism”) he observed that  
 
“[a]t a time when the authorities had no direct control over the 
domestic rate of interest or the other inducements to home 
investment, measures to increase the favorable balance of trade 
were the only direct means at their disposal for increasing 
foreign investment; and, at the same time, the effect of a 
favorable balance of trade on the influx of the precious metals 
was their only indirect means of reducing the domestic rate of 
interest and so increasing the inducement to home investment” 
(Keynes 1936: Vol. 7, p. 336). 
 
  
Compared to the gold-standard era, the U.S. dollar standard (described in section 
2, above) can more easily avoid any deflationary bias arising from mercantilistic 
development strategies as long as the n
th country willingly accommodates such endeavors 
by tolerating current account deficits and creating international liquidity along the way. 
As regards self-insurance strategies, too, the tendency for key currency appreciation 
resulting of any increased international liquidity preference can be similarly met by 
easing monetary conditions at the center. As private capital flows from the center towards 
the developing periphery further magnify the global dollar glut, spreading the monetary 
conditions set at the center throughout the dollar zone, individual peripheral countries 
may fine-tune their local conditions through steering the degree of sterilization of reserve   26
inflows and adjusting fiscal stance. But what benefits does financial globalization, 
including full capital account convertibility, really have to offer to developing countries?  
  Arguably, access to export markets and technology transfer are the two key 
external contributors to development. And these two factors may well require foreign 
direct investment (FDI) to work best. But granting FDI an important role in development 
is not the same thing as accepting full capital account convertibility, particularly if capital 
account convertibility either results in an uncompetitive exchange rate followed by 
financial crisis or turns developing countries into net capital exporters whilst foreign 
portfolio investors and bankers are invited to share the rewards of the developing world’s 
catching-up process—and without even properly financing it! The former outcome 
typically involves massive macroeconomic damages at some point, the latter substantial 
insurance costs—with as-yet unproven long-term success in avoidance of 
macroeconomic disruptions. Neither outcome can be said to unambiguously enhance 
macroeconomic efficiency and both also come along with significant microeconomic 
distortions.
11  
  Rather than taking out costly self-insurance against unleashed external “market 
wisdom,” policymakers should deliberately manage their country’s exposure to global 
finance with a view of fostering the national interest.
12 Active and comprehensive 
management of the capital account through a permanent regulatory regime incorporating 
room for countercyclical adjustment and with policy controls that target both the 
aggregate and the composition of capital inflows and outflows may be a superior strategy. 
Controlling aggregate capital flows serves the macroeconomic end of maintaining policy 
space so as to best align macroeconomic policy stance with local requirements (i.e., to 
decouple, if needed, from external macroeconomic conditions). Being selective regarding 
the composition of capital flows serves both macroeconomic and microeconomic ends.  
                                                 
11 Another approach to rationalize capital account convertibility is to blame capital controls for causing 
distortions with a microeconomic price tag [for a critique, see Comert, Jayadeve, and Epstein (2008)]. My 
point is that microeconomic inefficiencies do arise in situations of exchange rate overvaluation and asset 
price bubbles, which have been frequently experienced with open capital accounts even prior to any macro 
collateral damage as a crisis hits. Furthermore, I ventured above that the mercantilist strategy of exchange 
rate undervaluation may be afflicted by similar shortcomings and prove suboptimal in the long term, too. 
12 See Kregel (2004), who argues that open capital accounts and reliance on external private financing of 
development tends to easily evolve into Ponzi-like financing schemes bound to end in crisis anyway.   27
  In particular, from a macroeconomic perspective, types of inflows should be 
barred that tend to undermine national policy space and enhance the risk of financial 
fragility (through currency or maturity mismatches, etc.) In general, inflows should be 
restricted to FDI only and maturities of inflows should be in line with the (long-term) 
projects they promote. This aim can be made compatible with liquidity needs of foreign 
investors through the use of depository receipts. By contrast, there is no role for portfolio 
investments and bank lending (beyond trade finance), types of financing which tend to be 
volatile and procyclical. From a microeconomic perspective, the focus should be on 
matching external business expertise with any particular national development strategy.  
  This general approach also applies to capital outflows. With a reduced need for 
self-insurance through precautionary reserves, management of capital outflows should 
follow the following ranking: Priority should be given to the strategic use by national 
corporations though FDI outflows; yield-focused portfolio investments through 
Sovereign Wealth Funds come next; and adjustable allowances for private investors and 
travelers may provide another element of flexibility in the overall management of the 
capital account.  
  Confronted with evidence showing that “developing countries that have relied less 
on foreign finance have grown faster in the long run” (Prasad, Rajan, and Subramanian 
2007), mainstream debate has redirected its search for justifications of financial 
globalization through turning toward suspected “indirect or ‘collateral’ benefits that 
accrue to a country’s governance and institutions when it opens up to cross-border capital 
flows” (Prasad and Rajan 2008: 2). The core idea here is that capital account 
liberalization, through exposing the domestic financial sector to international 
competition, can act as a catalyst for domestic financial development. Other “collateral 
benefits” are supposed to arise through the spurring of improvements in domestic 
corporate governance, as well as alleged disciplining effects on governments and 
macroeconomic policy in general. These indirect benefits are believed to apply to capital 
flows in general, including portfolio investments and bank lending, which are supposed 
to improve the efficiency of liberalized domestic equity and debt markets and bank 
lending, respectively.    28
  To begin with, it will be readily acknowledged that in cases of thoroughly corrupt 
and/or incompetent governments, any hopes for implementing a sound development 
strategy may be unfounded. It does not follow that governments in general are to be 
“disarmed” through unleashed market discipline imposed by external powers with a 
proven record of volatile and procyclical conduct causing both microeconomic distortions 
and macroeconomic instabilities. Such self-serving attitudes may be the convenient 
“consensus” in certain quarters representing certain vested interests, but among 
enlightened observers and policymakers alike, the invisible hand of financial market 
forces is known to be fallible and in need of regulation and guidance.  
  One key issue is the sheer size of institutional investors based in the developed 
world relative to the breadth and depth of financial systems in the developing world. It is 
easy to claim that giving the former a free hand to play in the latter will freely extend the 
former’s wisdom to the development of the latter. It is of some interest to see that as soon 
as developing-country-based sovereign wealth funds of any noticeable size show any 
interest in playing on the home turf of global financial market wisdom, all sorts of 
concerns are quickly launched to stop them by developed-country government control.  
  Another key issue is that any of those supposed microeconomic efficiency gains 
can also be reaped under a regime of restrictive capital account liberalization focusing on 
selective FDI only when joined by targeted financial services trade, namely through 
importing the services of foreign experts and advisors. The importation of technology, 
managerial skills, and expertise may be necessary, but the liquidity of financial markets 
and financing of development can be organized and produced domestically on the basis 
of domestic claims rather than low-yielding international reserves. Domestic organization 
of finance avoids both the pitfalls of an open capital account, as well as the self-insurance 
premium otherwise incurred.  
  The point is that, with net capital outflows, free access to foreign finance does not 
provide any actual finance for development anyway. The arriving private capital inflows 
may give foreigners claims to domestic assets offering high yields owing to the country’s 
catching up process, but what those foreigners provide to the developing country in terms 
of foreign finance is more or less automatically parked in low-yielding international 
reserves—not actually providing any finance for development at all. In fact, it seems   29
ironic that the authorities’ main challenge ends up being one of mopping up excess 
liquidity creation based on bloated international reserves.  
  The irony involved here was rather nicely revealed in the advice given by Pimco’s 
Bill (“Bond King”) Gross, who proclaimed that “You want to invest where the growth is. 
The growth is in Asia and the growth is outside the United States. .. To be invested in 
U.S. fixed income is to be at a disadvantage twice” (quoted by Bloomberg, May 21, 
2008). While making perfect sense from a foreign portfolio investor’s perspective, do not 
overlook that given the unnecessarily increased exposure to financial fragility undertaken 
by the developing country in the process, the very assets that Bill Gross advises not to 
hold actually end up in the portfolios of developing countries’ official sectors.  
  There is no good sense for developing countries in granting foreign pension 
funds, hedge funds, or other foreign portfolio investors or bankers free access to 
participating in the rewards of developing countries’ catching-up process. Aggregate 
liquidity creation can be equally well-based on domestic claims, paired with importing 
any foreign expertise needed for making efficient micro picks of projects and firms. 
While public-debt-financed infrastructure investment plays a natural role in this, the point 
is that finance for private business also may be organized by service import rather than 
private capital flows. This alternative policy may include granting foreign banks and 
other financial institutions licenses to do business in domestic markets, as long as they 
operate under the same regulatory regime as their domestic competitors. And imports of 
expert services of any kind would surely come “at a fee,” too.
13 But developing countries 
would no longer hand over part of the fruits of their catching up to foreign rentiers.  
  To be sure, any proposal for comprehensive capital account management, rather 
than openness, will be countered by alleging the ineffectiveness of capital controls. 
Again, this argument may well be true in cases of thoroughly corrupt and/or incompetent 
governments. But it does not follow that abolishing government and making room for the 
law of the jungle will guaranty best outcomes in the best of all worlds. In general, capital 
controls can be made effective, much to the nuisance of certain interests [see Epstein, 
                                                 
13 As a complementary piece of advice, consider the strategy of using low-yielding international reserves to 
provide student grants for studying at top foreign universities and business schools linked with contracts for 
the students to return to their home country and apply their expertise to the benefit of their sponsor’s 
development.  
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Grabel, and Jomo (2004) and Ma and McCauley (2007), for instance]. The flexible 
application of both quantitative and qualitative instruments can enliven the strategy 
outlined here and create the national policy space needed for an export-oriented 
development strategy that forecloses the rent extraction through self-insurance 
characterizing the currently propagated form of financial globalization. Comprehensive 
foreign exchange controls are at the heart of the matter; much depends on the licensing 
process and law enforcement.  
  Finally, let me add that I believe the general thrust of the strategy outlined here to 
be in the spirit of Keynes’s vision for the postwar world. His aim was to both disable 
countries to pursue mercantilist strategies (as under BWII) and enable them to 
systematically pursue domestic demand-led growth through deliberate management of 
their economies instead. Capital controls were an important element in creating sufficient 
national policy space. His foreseen international monetary order featured symmetry in 
adjustment pressures through quasiautomatic exchange rate adjustments targeting 
balanced current account positions, with access to official international liquidity to bridge 
temporary imbalances. International bank money of elastic supply was to provide costless 
collective insurance [cf. Bibow (2009)]. Arguably, Keynes’s vision provides a better 
benchmark to assess the developing world’s opportunity costs of insuring against risks 
that do not seem to come along with any rewards that would justify the risk-taking in the 
first place. 
  Is it at least worth paying the insurance premium under current conditions then? 
The impressive performance in the developing world and avoidance of any “emerging 
market crisis” in recent years might suggest that it is indeed worthwhile. However, in 
view of the analysis of the international monetary (non-)order (presented in section 2) it 
is not all that surprising that the “missing crisis” is, this time round, occurring at the core 
of the international financial system instead. And in contrast to proponents of BWII 
(analyzed in section 3), we have strong doubts that the old regime can be fixed quickly 
and the developing world’s impressive record of late be sustained along those lines.  
  To prolong that record, developing countries had to decouple from the sputtering 
U.S. engine. And at least at the early stage of the U.S. domestic demand slowdown, many 
of them were quite successful at that, more successful than Japan and Euroland. But   31
drawing on their self-insurance has changed the nature of the regime, as one source of 
U.S. dollar reserves is cooling off with the shrinking of the U.S. current account deficit. 
The other source may have largely dried up in the course of 2008, too, owing to 
“repatriations” of portfolio investments and disengagements of western banks in 
emerging markets in the context of worsening banking problems at the core of the global 
financial system and the general rise in risk aversion favoring U.S. Treasuries. Trends in 
real exchange rate that had been in place since 2002 sharply reversed in this context, with 
the dollar and the yen (as key carry-trade funding currencies) rising sharply against all 
others. Generally speaking, downward pressures on emerging-market currencies proved 
stronger for countries running current account deficits compared to those with a surplus 
position.
14 Reliance on export-driven growth does not seem an option for developing 
countries as long as the United States contracts. Switching strategy and boosting 
domestic demand will tend to turn current account balances around. We may still be 
debating the sustainability of BWII when the nature of the regime has already changed 
quite fundamentally.  
 
6. SOME CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS 
 
This paper argues that the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system of pegged-but-
adjustable exchange rates in the early 1970s has not fundamentally changed the 
hegemonic position of the U.S. dollar and the U.S.’s n
th country role in the global 
economy. Floating exchange rates together with financial globalization have, if anything, 
further magnified both the influence of and benefits thereby bestowed upon the issuer of 
the system’s key currency. Since the early 1980s, U.S. global leadership included acting 
as lead driver of global demand growth most of the time, resulting in almost continuous 
current account deficits ever since. While the build-up of the U.S. current account deficit 
is owed to a number of factors, this paper focuses on the conspicuous turnaround in the 
developing world’s current account position following the Asian crises of the late 1990s.  
                                                 
14 Developing countries running large current account deficits (as a percent of their GDP) are concentrated 
among prospective Euroland members owing to huge private capital flows. Even with IMF and EU support, 
it remains to be seen whether the imbalances created thereby will be worked off in a nondisruptive fashion.    32
  The investment and growth performance of developing countries running current 
account surpluses since then has undeniably undermined the mainstream “chronic saving 
gap” presumption. But there is also the issue of opportunity costs of self-insurance 
through bloated precautionary reserve holdings sourced from both current account 
surpluses and private capital inflows—another paradoxical feature of the global capital 
flows paradox. The analysis here not only suggests that the opportunity costs of self-
insurance may be non-negligible, it also fundamentally challenges the wisdom of insuring 
the exposure to risks that offer no rewards to developing countries in the first place. 
Essentially, financial globalization appears like a nifty device for rent extraction working 
through the defensive behavior of developing countries.  
  The IMF acted as the main protagonist of universal capital account convertibility. 
And the Fund’s emergency lending and influence soared in the 1990s as emerging 
markets, heeding orthodox advice for financial liberalization, frequently got hit by 
financial crises. The IMF then faced its own crisis as the Fund’s loan portfolio and 
income plunged when its supposed customers substituted self-insurance for the IMF’s 
services. The Fund has not changed course on capital account liberalization, peddling its 
advice on “managing large capital inflows” instead.
15 And as some fresh rescue requests 
arrived at the IMF’s doorstep in the fall of 2008 from countries that were running large 
current account deficits, this would seem to underline that running a current account 
surplus offers some safety. Self-insurance is not a free lunch though.  
Essentially, private global finance has largely taken over the business of the 
official international monetary support line. The insurance premium thereby extracted 
from developing countries for reclaiming part of the policy space lost through financial 
globalization is significant. Some rationalize the outcome by claiming that the welfare 
gains of self-insurance outweigh any welfare costs (Aizenman and Lee 2007). Cost-
benefit analyses of self-insurance are beside the point though when the risk exposure 
insured against offers no real rewards otherwise unavailable in the first place. 
                                                 
15 In its October 2007 World Economic Outlook, the IMF acknowledges the policy challenges posed by 
capital inflows referring to “their potential to generate overheating, loss of competitiveness, and increased 
vulnerability to crisis” (IMF 2007: ch. 3, p. 1). Fiscal restraint (i.e., small government) emerges as the best 
policy response available in the Fund’s view. It is not clear though that curtailing public investment in 
order to let hot money play its games necessarily offers a favorable trade-off to developing countries.  
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  There is another more preferable route out. Instead of full capital account 
convertibility, we propose comprehensive capital account management, both with respect 
to the aggregate and the composition of capital flows. The aims of a permanent 
regulatory regime of capital controls are twofold: first, to maintain sufficient macro 
policy space and prevent destabilizing hot money; and second, to assure a good micro fit 
of external expertise incorporated in FDI with a country’s development strategy. This 
approach would not only avoid the self-insurance premium currently extracted from 
developing countries for insuring exposures that offer no real rewards in the first place. It 
should also help them get off a development strategy that might prove less sustainable 
than suggested by proponents of BWII—a process that seems already well under way. In 
fact, the financial crisis currently unfolding at the center of the international financial 
system—much in contrast to the former history of emerging market crises—raises further 
doubts about the true value of the “insurance scheme” apparently underlying the “global 
capital flows paradox.”     34
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